![]() A Ukrainian breakthrough in southern Ukraine could put at risk Russia’s hold on Crimea. Recent reports that Ukraine is experiencing shortages of artillery shells to defend against the latest Russian offensive are indicative of the likely challenges it will face once it launches its own offensive operation in the south of the country and, by extension, needs to expend ammunition at a much higher rate to press the attack.Įven if a Ukrainian offensive is successful, notwithstanding these likely obstacles and heavy losses the Ukrainian army may suffer in the course of it, the war will not come to an end. Military analysts assess that the Ukrainian army will have to conduct them against a Russian army that has had time to recover somewhat from the setbacks it suffered last summer and fall and dig in to prepare for the widely anticipated Ukrainian offensive. ![]() Offensive operations are an inherently more difficult form of warfare than defense. The next phase of the war promises to be very difficult for Ukraine. Yet that decisive breakthrough has so far eluded the Ukrainian army. With every new weapons system provided to Ukraine, hopes rise for a breakthrough and a decisive turn in the course of the war. From drones and tanks to artillery shells and real-time targeting data, the United States and its allies have supplied Ukrainian armed forces with ever-increasing, ever-more-lethal hardware and support. The West has extended massive amounts of military assistance to Ukraine over the past twelve months. This plan appears to be based as much on hope as on experience. These numbers do not favor Ukraine, a fact that is recognized by those who advocate for an immediate dramatic increase of Western assistance to Ukraine to enable it to achieve decisive results quickly and force Putin’s hand to negotiate on terms favorable to Ukraine. While Russian losses are reported widely, the extent of Ukrainian losses is less well known.įor Ukraine, it is a bigger loss than for Russia. Ukraine’s losses are estimated at 100,000. Russia has suffered massive casualties-reportedly 200,000 dead and wounded. Millions of its citizens have been displaced, many of them probably permanently. Its reconstruction costs are projected to exceed $1 trillion. Its GDP is estimated to have declined by one-third in 2022. It has suffered catastrophic damage to its economy. It is under relentless Russian bombardment. Notwithstanding the bravery and resilience of its people, its ability to carry on the fight depends on the West’s military and financial support. Ukraine is now in effect a ward of the EU and NATO. Its defense factories are operating “ around the clock,” and Putin has pledged to spend as much as it takes to supply his troops. Russia’s territory is intact and unlike Ukraine’s, it is not under the constant threat of bombardment. The prewar population of Russia was three times larger than the population of Ukraine. ![]() It is selling record volumes of oil to India and China, and it has found other buyers and acquired a fleet of tankers to bypass Western sanctions. But countries adapt, as Russia is doing already, with alternative supply chains, lower-tech replacements, and jerry-rigged substitutes for components it can no longer get. Successive waves of unprecedented sanctions have hurt the Russian economy and damaged its prospects for growth in the long run. After contracting by about 2–4 percent in 2022, the Russian economy is projected to resume growing, albeit slowly, in 2023. In 2021, the last prewar year, Russia’s GDP was nine times larger than Ukraine’s GDP. ![]() In a long war, the correlation of forces favors Russia. He has staked his entire presidency on it and must win it. This war was not existential for him when he began it, but it is now. For Putin, whose war it is primarily, compromise is not an option after the humiliation of the failed campaign in pursuit of his maximalist objectives. Ukrainians, having tasted victory on the battlefield and united in their desire for justice and revenge, cannot accept a land-for-peace compromise. National Intelligence Council, is a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program. Rumer, a former national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the U.S. ![]()
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